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The theory of large games, in both its anonymous and non-anonymous formulations,
is by now well-understood.1 Under the assumption that a player's payo®s depend, in
addition to her own action, on a statistical summary, be it an average or a distribution,
of the plays of everyone else in the game, the basic thrust of the theory is its focus on
pure strategy equilibria. Indeed, this constitutes the raison d'etre of the theory and is
easily justi¯ed by virtue of the fact that pure strategy equilibria do not necessarily exist
in games with a ¯nite set of players.2 The two distinguished, and de¯ning, features of
the theory are a player's numerical negligibility and her societal interdependence in the
original Nash formulation being substituted by more composite and aggregate measures
of the actions of everyone else in the game. Within such a rubric, results on the existence
of pure strategy equilibria, as well as their asymptotic implementability and invariance
to permutations of names, have been established.3 In addition, issues concerning mea-
surability, puri¯cation and symmetrization have been identi¯ed and resolved in terms of
decisive counterexamples and attendant theorems. The resulting theory has been shown
to hinge on the cardinality of the underlying action set: if it is a ¯nite,4 or a countably
in¯nite, set,5 numerical negligibility of an individual player can be successfully formalized
by an arbitrary atomless probability space; if, on the other hand, it is uncountable and
compact, say even the unit interval, an arbitrary probability space does not su±ce, and
additional structure has to be put on the formalization of agent multiplicity. Initially,
such a structure was invoked through the consideration of an atomless Loeb probability
space, but recent work has identi¯ed a crucial property, namely saturation, and shown
that agent multiplicity formalized by atomless saturated probability spaces, a more gen-
eral class to which atomless Loeb probability spaces belong,6 is not only su±cient but
also necessary for the results to hold. We have thereby a viable and robust theory of
large games.
A technical point of departure for the theory is the fact that the players' names
do not have a natural \measure of closeness" de¯ned on them, and that therefore the
1For details as to terminology and bibliographic substantiation of all claims in the ensuing paragraph,
except those embodied in the last sentence, see the survey chapter [32] and their references. For saturated
probability spaces mentioned in the last sentence, see [24] and [28]. We have stated two characterizations
for the reader's convenience as Propositions 1 and 2 below. Other references will be furnished in the
sequel as the need for them arises.
2The matching-pennies game is a canonical, though by no means the only, example in this regard.
3See [31] where the invariance to permutations is labelled as the homogeneity property.
4Various results related to pure strategy Nash equilibria in the case of ¯nite actions follow from a
general puri¯cation principle formulated by Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz in early 1950s; see [29].
5See [50] for the relaxation of the compactness assumption on action sets in [30].
6Other examples are constituted by product spaces of the form f0;1g· where f0;1g has the uniform
measure and · is an uncountable cardinal; see [24].
1space of such names has to be conceived as an abstract rather than a topological measure
space. It is by now well-appreciated that this space has necessarily to be endowed with an
abstract measurable structure rather than a Borel or Baire structure that is metrically-,
or more generally, topologically-generated. From a substantive point of view however,
this has led to a theory that, in its most basic form, is informationally sparse. It is
sparse in the sense that each agent,7 in taking the distribution of the societal actions as
given, is focussed only on the proportions of agents playing certain actions, and oblivious
to any measurable social-types8 or social or biological traits by which the players could
also be distinguished. This is to say that the theory, as currently formulated, ignores
players' traits more generally conceived. Thus, in the context of tra±c moving through
a bridge or a tunnel, an individual decision-maker deciding on a possible route, again as
conceived by the theory, notes only the proportion of the tra±c moving through one of the
two alternative routes, and disregards as irrelevant to her decision all other information
concerning tra±c-traits, including the proportion of truck-drivers and the unruliness
of driving patterns. In another illustrative context, in deciding which of two possible
candidates to vote for, an agent, as conceived by the theory, is concerned only with the
proportion of the electorate that votes for either of the candidates, and thereby neglects
all other information relating to a voter's biological or socioeconomic traits, proxied by
variables that may be continuous and/or discrete. In short, the theory ignores race or
gender as relevant categories for the equilibrium outcome.
To be sure, even the very early extensions of the theory did consider situations
where the space of players' names could be conceived as being ¯nitely partitioned, and
an agent's preferences taken to depend on the mean or the distribution of the pro¯le of
societal actions when this pro¯le is restricted to each individual element of this partition.9
Indeed, recent work has shown that the results can be extended to partitions with a
countably in¯nite set of elements. This is of course important in that in removing the
¯niteness assumption, it removes an arbitrary and uniform bound on the grouping of
agents.10 There are sublists of names, ¯nite or countably in¯nite, according to which a
7In the sequel, and especially in the informal discussion, we shall use \agent" interchangeably with
\player," and \society" interchangeably with \all the players."
8Note that we are avoiding the word type on its own, using it always with its hyphenated counterpart.
This is being done to keep away from the notion of Harsanyi types that refers primarily to player beliefs.
As elaborated below, we have the sociological and, older biological, pre-game-theory usage in mind; the
reader can see, for example, the ¯rst essay in [25] and track his use of the word type, and note that
we use the word trait in conformity with his pre-Harsanyi notion of type. Hence also the composite
bio-social typology in the title. We defer for future work, once a satisfactory formulation of the theory
with a multiplicity of social-types is available, an integration of beliefs; however, see [47].
9This case of a ¯nite partition goes back to Remark 2 in [42]; for subsequent work, see the references
in [32] and subsequent to that survey, in [50].
10See Chapter 5 in [22], and note that his dissertation presents an extension in the context of both
countable and uncountable compact metric action sets.
2continuum of agents is grouped, and an agent is dependent on society's plays only to the
extent that she is dependent on the summary statistics pertaining to the individuals in
each of these exogenously classi¯ed sublists or subgroups. However, nothing is said as
regards how such sublists are determined, which is to say that the grouping of names is
not tethered to observable and quantitatively measurable bio-social traits of the players.
The players within the same subgroup can be interpreted as having the same social-
type. However, there could be cases where the number of distinct social-types is not
discrete.For example, the payo®s may depend on societal summary statistics that involves
a continuum of socioeconomic traits, possibly income levels in the voting context, or
vehicle-tonnage in the tra±c example. For example, markets fail in situations of adverse
selection precisely when a player is unwilling to subsidize agents perceived by him or her
to be ranked \below" her traits. Whether this perception is \objective" or universally
subscribed to by all of the players in the game is hardly relevant; it ¯gures in each
individual's decision. To pursue the point a little more, rather than a ¯nite or a countable
in¯nite list of exogenous classi¯cations, one wants to deal with situations when the
particular subset of society whose summary statistics are seen as relevant for an agent's
decisions, is decided on by the agents' socioeconomic traits in the group, possibly income
levels in the voting context, or vehicle-tonnage in the tra±c example.
Thus, inspite of the useful earlier extensions, the theory remains, what we are
characterizing here as being, informationally sparse. The question then is whether it can
be reformulated and extended to situations where an agent, in deciding on her individual
action, has available to her comprehensive information not only on what players in a
particular sublist are playing, but also on the variety of social-types or biological and
other traits associated with the players in that sublist, as well as some conception of
the social group she belongs to and the type of traits she shares. This is to ask, in
other words, whether the theory can be generalized to take into account the fact that a
player has a name as well as a social-type or trait,11 the former being chosen from an
abstract probability space (I;I;¸); the latter from a separable metric space T; and with
a deterministic (measurable) function ® connecting each element of one to the other, a
social-type or trait to an individual name, as one of the essential constituents of the data
of the large game. The essence of the reformulation then is to conceive of the summary of
societal actions as distributions on the product space of actions and traits such that their
marginal distribution on the space of traits is always identical to the given distribution of
traits of the game, this distribution ½ being induced on the trait space T by the function
®: This allows an individual player access to information based on traits as well as on
11As has already been emphasized above in Footnote 8, we are using social-type and trait as synony-
mous terms. As we shall see in the sequel, we use characteristic as a more general term that also covers
a player's payo®s.
3proportions, and with individual payo®s depending on the action set, on the one hand,
and on an extended space of externalities on the other. One can now formally de¯ne
a non-anonymous game and its Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and proceed with
an investigation of these reformulated objects. It is precisely such an extension that is
being o®ered in this paper.
However, before getting into the technical di±culties of such an extension, it is
important to note that our basic motivation, coming as it does from the theory of large
games, dovetails into the rich theoretical and econometric work on identity and social
interactions pioneered by Akerlof-Kranton [1].12 They abstract their paper on \economics
and identity" with the following words.
This paper considers how identity, a person's sense of self, a®ects economic out-
comes. In the utility function we propose, identity is associated with di®erent
social categories and how people in these categories should behave. We then con-
struct a simple game-theoretic model showing how identity can a®ect individual
interactions.
The point is that the reformulation that we study lifts the Akerlof-Kranton conception
from the setting of a ¯nite game to that of a large game, and even though there are
important di®erences between the conception studied in this paper and theirs, there is
an undeniable complementarity.13 This can be most easily seen by considering the utility
function of the ith-player on which their analysis revolves:
Ui = Ui(ai;a¡i;Ii); with Ii = Ii(ai;a¡i;ci;²i;P);
where ai is the ith-player's action, a¡i the actions of everyone else in the ¯nite game, and
the novel variable Ii which \shows how identity can be brought into economic analysis,
allowing a new view of many economic problems." This \new type of externality" Ii
depends on the particular social category ci chosen from a set of exogenously-given
categories C; and on how the player's \own" given trait ²i match the ideal of i's assigned
category indicated by the exogenously-given prescriptions P: In the context of the model
of this paper, this \new type of externality" is given by the inclusion of ¿ in an individual
player's utility function
Ui = Ui(a;¿) with ¿ = ¸(®;f)
¡1 2 M
½(T £ A);
12The reader can also see the subsequent surveys in [26] and [14], and their rich and diverse bibliogra-
phies.
13There are passages in [1] where their context is clearly that of a \large" society; see, for example,
their \identity model of poverty and social exclusion" in which they conceive of a \a large community,
normalized to size one, of individuals (page 740)." As such, the model reported here can be seen also
be seen as presenting a rigorous formalization of their ideas.
4where ¿ is a probability measure on actions and traits analogous to the individual iden-
tity variable Ij; and one which is endogenously obtained as a distribution of the Nash
equilibrium f taking names into actions. In keeping with our large-game formulation,
only a summary of societal actions play a role. There is of course more to be said in
terms of a comparison between the two models, and we shall do so in the sequel.
The fact is that the extension of the theory to the model discussed in the above
paragraph is not straightforward, and as shown in Example 1 below, there is no Nash
equilibrium in a large non-anonymous game in which the set of players' names are for-
malized as an arbitrary, atomless probability space with the unit interval I as the space
of traits even when the cardinality of the common action set is two! In particular, Ex-
ample 1 below considers a large game of matching pennies with balanced players, where
the space of names is modeled as the Lebesgue unit interval and with the ith player
who always tries to balance out those players younger than him or her in the sense that
if there are more younger players who play Heads (Tails), then player i will play Tail
(Head). With this counterexample, it is clear that additional assumptions will have to
be made on the space of players names if the cardinality of the space of players' traits is
not to be restricted.
It is worth emphasizing that the signi¯cance of this example for the theory of large
games does not end with it closing the door to the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in situations where players have names as well as traits, and the space of
players' names is formalized as any abstract probability space; to wit, the Lebesgue unit
interval. It raises an equally interesting issue when discretized and cast in the form of
a sequence of games with a large but ¯nite set of players. It is now well understood
that in general a discretized sequence of ¯nite games has only an approximate equilibria
in pure strategies, with the approximation becoming ¯ner as the number of players
becomes larger.14 What is interesting in the sequence of ¯nite-player games which is
a discrete version of the game in Example 1 is that each of its elements has an exact
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (see Example 2 below)! Thus, an arbitrary atomless
measure space of players' names, the Lebesgue unit interval in particular, is doubly
inappropriate. There is no equilibrium for the idealized game even though there is an
exact equilibrium for the elements of a sequence converging to the idealized game. It
is thus clear that additional assumptions will have to be made on the space of players'
names, and the example is decisive in establishing that an arbitrary atomless probability
14This is precisely the question of asymptotic implementability of an idealized limit game; see [32] for a
discussion. If speci¯c speeds of convergence are required, which is to say, the determination of the error
for an arbitrarily given ¯nite game, see [41]. These alternative ways of formalizing a particular kind
of regularity for systems with a continuum of agents are now well-understood; in addition to Khan's
Palgrave entries, see [16] for a more recent revisiting of this issue, see .
5space simply will not do.
The point of departure for this paper is this additional assumption in the require-
ment that the space of players' names not only be atomless but that it satisfy the property
of saturation.15 The property is simple enough that it can be verbally stated even in an
introduction oriented to a general audience: a probability space has the saturation prop-
erty for a measure ¹ on a product of two complete, separable and metrizable (Polish)
spaces, X and Y , if for any random variable taking values in one of these spaces, say
X; and whose induced measure is the marginal of the given measure on that space, ¹X;
there exists another twin random variable in the other space Y such that the induced
measure of the pair of random variables is the given measure ¹: An atomless probability
measure is saturated if it has the saturation property for all X; Y and ¹: Such a notion
is natural for, and entirely amenable to, the theory of large games. Indeed, an atomless
probability space is saturated if and only if every non-anonymous game based on an
uncountable compact metric action space has a Nash equilibrium.16 It is this property
of a Loeb space that is responsible for the robust viability of the theory of large games
with a compact metric action set;17 and furthermore, it is necessary in the sense that
the results are false without it. The fact that the Lebesgue unit interval does not satisfy
this property then emerges as rather routine anti-climax.
With the assumption of an atomless, saturated probability space, and with the
counterexample thereby bypassed and made irrelevant, one can proceed with a basic
extension of the theory. And with this reformulation in hand, we can now present a
comprehensive extension of the theory along its standard desiderata emphasized more
than a decade ago: a saturated probability space is su±cient for the existence of Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies; that these Nash equilibria translate into their approxi-
mate counterparts for large but ¯nite games, which is to say that the existence result
is asymptotically implementable; and that these equilibria are invariant with respect to
permutations of the players' names in the game. However, we can do substantially more
on two counts. The ¯rst concerns the necessity of saturated probability spaces. The
standard desiderata were put forward and executed in [31] in the context of Loeb prob-
ability spaces, and there was no presumption that these results would not conceivably
hold for other probability spaces.18 In short, there was no question of a Loeb measure
15The saturation property of probability spaces was introduced in [24], and applied to the theory of
large games in [28].
16This is Theorem 4.5 in [28]. Note that the authors avoid the anonymous/non-anonymous classi¯-
cation of large games, and use the terminology game/measure-game. Their theorem is reproduced as
Proposition 2 in Section 4 and underscores our use of the word natural in the context of large games.
17We refer here of course to the available theory, one that does not take the reformulation that is
being pursued in this paper, into account. The fact that that the results generalize to include the
reformulation is of course the objective of this paper.
18Also see [32] in connection with the conventional theory.
6space being necessary for the results. We now close this door by showing that saturated
probability spaces are necessary and su±cient for our results on the existence of pure
strategy equilibria.19 These \necessity results," in emphasizing the irrelevance to the ex-
istence theory of pure strategy Nash equilibria of all probability spaces whose ¾-algebras
are countably generated, leave alone Lebesgue spaces, are important and new to this
paper.
As regards the second count, we can go further by considering randomization and
coupling our discussion of Nash equilibria in pure strategies with those in behavioral and
mixed strategies, all for the reformulated large games studied here. Since the relation-
ship between these concepts has not attained a complete resolution even for the standard
theory, we ¯rst present the ideas in that set-up. If I is the space of players names, and A
the common action space, a pure strategy pro¯le is simply a measurable function from
I to A; and a behavioral strategy pro¯le a measurable function from I to the distribu-
tions on A; M(A).20 Other than an implicit understanding that the randomizations of
individual agents underlying the distributions in a behavioral strategy are independent
of each other, as be¯ts a theory of non-cooperative games, there has been no explicit
formalization of a second probability space linking these randomizations, and perhaps no
need for a recourse to one. It is a concern with a viable de¯nition of mixed strategies that
one is led to a coupling of the space of players names with a probability space formaliz-
ing the independent randomizations, a concern that meets runs against the wall of the
\measurability problem". As is by now understood as a result of work done in the last
¯fteen years, the resolution of this measurability problem requires an extension of the
product probability space so that the Fubini property holds for the extension, and leads
to an exact law of large numbers (ELLN) for a continuum of random variables that are
essentially pairwise-independent.21 With this conception in hand, an elegant and simple
application to the theory of large games allows one to formulate a mixed strategy pro¯le
simply as an essentially pairwise-independent process from I £ ­ to A that satis¯es the
Nash inequalities, and allows an equivalence between behavioral and mixed strategies.
Every behavioral strategy pro¯le can be represented by a mixed strategy, and that a
mixed strategy induces, in the straightforward way, a behavioral strategy pro¯le.
In a section titled \large games with independent idiosyncratic shocks", [32] consider
an essentially pairwise-independent process f as a Nash equilibrium of a large game with
random payo®s. By the ELLN, the ex-post realization f! forms a pure strategy Nash
19Thus, as long as the player space is non-saturated, there exists a large game with traits that has no
equilibrium in pure strategies.
20Such a strategy pro¯le is also called a measure-valued pro¯le in [38].
21See [44, 46] for a rigorous development of the exact law of large numbers, and for the reference in
[44] to a 1996 announcement in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. In particular, [46, Corollary 2.9]) is
what is needed in this paper.
7equilibrium of the corresponding ex-post large game with probability one. When one
considers the special case that the random payo®s are actually deterministic, the process
f is very much like the conception of a mixed strategy equilibrium as mentioned in
the above paragraph. Thus the ELLN implies immediately the ex-post Nash property,
i.e., the ex-post realization of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is essentially a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.22 The conceptual idea goes back to Cremer-McLean [18] in
the context of auctions and mechanism design; also see [35] in the context of expost
Walrasian equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We con¯ne Section 2 to a parsimonious
description of the reformulation of a large game that has been informally described above,
and show how it includes earlier formulations of large games based on an exogenously-
given ¯nite or countably in¯nite partitions of the space of player's name. From both the
technical and conceptual points of views, it is the formulation societal dependence, or
externalities in the economic theory jargon, that sets the stage for the entire analysis to
follow. In Section 3, we present an example for the non-existence of Nash equilibrium in
large games, and show in a discretized version pertaining to a ¯nite game, the existence
of exact Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In section 4 we show the existence of a
pure strategy Nash equilibria under the hypothesis that the space of players' names is a
saturated probability space and the space of traits is a separable metric space, taking care
to emphasize that the assumption of a saturated probability space is necessary. We also
show that the reformulated game has the homogeneity property in that the equilibrium
distributions are invariant to permutations of the game that leave its distribution intact.
In section 5 we spell out the relationships between the three alternative solution concepts
and establish the ex-post Nash property of mixed strategy equilibria. Section 6 turns
to asymptotic implementation of these equilibria and specializes the existence result
to a tight sequence of large but ¯nite economies. Section 7 concludes the paper. In
the Appendix, we collect for the reader's convenience some relevant results from the
earlier literature, and also relegate to it some rather technical results that are required
in Sections 3 and 4.
2 A Reformulation
It is by now conventional to see a large non-anonymous game as being constituted by
two basic objects: an abstract atomless probability space (I;I;¸) representing the space
22See [38] for an earlier discussion of relevant issues with mixed strategies in a large game setting, and
[27] for an asymptotic version of the ex-post Nash property for large ¯nite games, and following him,
[17].
8of player names, and a compact metric space A representing a common action space.
The common action space is then used to build a space of payo® characteristics, thereby
leading to a de¯nition of a game and its Nash equilibrium. When endowed with its Borel
¾-algebra, the action set leads to the Borel measurable space (A;B(A)); and through it,
to the space M(A) of all probability measures on A endowed with its weak topology.23
The space M(A) is then also a compact metric space, and it represents the distributions
of possible plays in the game. In terms of the vocabulary used in the introduction, it
represents \externalities" or \society's plays". The space of players' payo®s UA is then
given by the space of all continuous functions on the product space (A £ M(A)); and
based on its sup-norm topology and endowed with its resulting Borel ¾-algebra, it can
also be conceived as a measurable space (UA;B(UA)) of players' characteristics. Note
that the space of players' names I does not ¯gure in the space of players' characteristics.
A large non-anonymous game is then a random variable in UA and its Nash equilibrium
a random variable in A: More formally,
De¯nition 1. A large non-anonymous game is a measurable function G0 from I to UA:
A Nash equilibrium of a game G0 is a measurable function f : I ¡! A, such that for









for all a 2 A:
All this is now standard.24
The reformulation of a large non-anonymous game that we study in this paper rests
on four, rather than two, basic objects: in addition to space of players' names I and the
common action set A; we work with a complete, separable metrizable (Polish) space T
representing a space of possible player traits, and endowed with a probability measure
½ on the Borel ¾-algebra B(T) induced by the topology on T: The game and its Nash
equilibria are then built up from these four basic objects. The ¯rst important element
in the reformulation is that the externalities or society's plays are now conceived as a
probability measure on the product space (T £ A); with the latter endowed with its
product Borel ¾-algebra,25 and such that the marginal of the measure on T is identical
to the given measure ½ on T: Formally, let M(T £ A) be the space of Borel probability
distributions on T £ A, and M½(T £ A) be the subspace of M(T £ A) such that for
any ¿ 2 M½(T £ A), its marginal probability on T, ¿T = ½. Note that unlike the space
23We conform to standard usage and forgo referring to this as the weak¤-topology, the formally correct
designation.
24In addition to [32], see [46] and [28].
25Since we are assuming separability everywhere, the product Borel ¾-algebra is the same as the Borel
¾-algebra of the product of the spaces T and A:
9M(A); the space M(T £ A) is not necessarily compact in the weak topology. However
it is a standard result that the space M½(T £ A) is indeed compact.
Now, just as in the conventional theory described in the ¯rst paragraph of this
section, the space of players' payo®s V(A;T;½) is then given by the space of all continuous
functions on the product space (A £ M½(T £ A)); and based on its sup-norm topology
and endowed with its resulting Borel ¾-algebra, it can also be conceived as a measurable
space (V(A;T;½);B(V(A;T;½))) of players' payo®s. The point to be made here is that in the
generalized setting with socioeconomic traits, this does not exhaust the set of player
characteristics which is now de¯ned as the product T £ V(A;T;½): Note that here again
the space of players' names I does not ¯gure in the space of players' characteristics. We
can now present a reformulation of a large non-anonymous game that again involves a
random variable, but one taking values in a richer target space.
De¯nition 2. A large non-anonymous game with traits is a measurable function G from
I to T £V(A;T;½) such that ¸G
¡1
1 = ½; where Gi is the projection of G on its ith-coordinate,
i = 1;2: A Nash equilibrium of a game G is a measurable function f : I ¡! A, such that










for all a 2 A:
On decomposing the target space (T £V(A;T;½)); we see that in our reformulation, a large
non-anonymous game, is really a pair of random variables, one a measurable function
® = G1 from I to T associating each player i 2 I with her traits, or rather an array of
traits ®(i) 2 T; and the other, a measurable function G2 associating each player i 2 I
with her payo® G2(i) 2 V(A;T;½); one that we are also referring to her trait.26
In the context of games with exogenously-given, ¯nite or countably-in¯nite, parti-
tions of the space of names, the earlier work of [30, 31], and its generalizations in [22], has
already been mentioned in the introduction. We conclude this section by showing how
the reformulation presented above subsumes these e®orts as it moves forward. Speci¯-
cally, we show how conventional formulations available in the literature are special cases
of De¯nition 2. The issue revolves around moving back and forth from the conventional
form of a large game where the externalities parameters are based on the Cartesian prod-
uct of probability measures on the action space, the index of the product running across
the index of a countable, possible in¯nite, partition of the space of names, to one where
it is based on a joint probability measure on the space of actions and traits. Since the
space of names and the common action set are shared by both formulations, this reduces
to moving back and forth between the payo® functions.
26See Footnotes 8 and 11 in this connection.
10Towards this end, let ftkgk2K be a list of all the elements of T, where K is an
index set which is at most countable.27 We have to relate a function v 2 V(A;T;½) to
another function u 2 UT
A where28 UT
A is the space of real-valued continuous functions on
A £
Q
t2T M(A). De¯ne a function
© : M
½(T £ A) ¡!
Y
t2T
M(A) such that ©(¿) = f¹tgt2T;
where for any t in T;
¹t(B) = ¿(ftg £ B)=½(t) for all B 2 B(A):





½(T £ A) such that ª(f¹tgt2T) = ¿;




½(t)¹t(Ct); Ct = fa 2 A : (t;a) 2 Cg:
It is now easy to check that ª is the inverse of ©; and that therefore the latter is a
bijective mapping. And since © takes a compact set into a compact set, we can claim
that it is also a homeomorphism if we show that © is continuous. We turn to this.
Suppose f¿mg weakly converges to ¿0: Denote ©(¿m) by f¹m
t gt2T and ©(¿0) by
f¹0
tgt2T: Now for any k 2 K; pick any ¹0
tk-continuity set B 2 B(A): Then it is clear
that (ftkg £ B) is a ¿0-continuity set in B(T £ A); and hence ¿m(ftkg £ B) converges
to ¿0(ftkg£B); and hence ¿m(ftkg£B)=½(tk) converges ¿0(ftkg£B)=½(tk); and hence
¹m
tk(B) converges to ¹0
tk(B): The assertion of our claim that © is a homeomorphism is
complete.
And now we can de¯ne a function ¹ © : UT
A ¡! V(A;T;½) such that, for all a 2 A;
v(a;¿) = ¹ ©(u)(a;¿) = u(a;©(¿));
u(a;f¹tgt2T) = ¹ ©
¡1(v)(a;f¹tgt2T) = v (a;ª(f¹tgt2T));
which allow one to go back and forth from the conventional formulation to the one
27Without loss of generality, assume that ½(ftkg) > 0 for all k 2 K.
28Note that De¯nition 1, as presented above deals with the case of T being a singleton; its extension
to the case when T has a ¯nite or a countably in¯nite set of elements is straightforward; see the end of
this section for the payo®s in this general setting.
11studied here.
3 Two Examples
In the classical example of a 2-player game of matching pennies, the players try to out-
play each other; one player wants the two pennies to match, while the other does not.
There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for such a game. In this section, we shall ¯rst
consider a large game of matching pennies in which the players are balanced and with
a multiplicity of traits. It has no Nash equilibrium in pure-strategies. We then consider
a corresponding discrete version of the game with exact Nash equilibria in ¯nite games
with traits.
Example 1: We consider a large game that is a natural generalization of the matching
pennies with two players. Let the space of players be the Lebesgue unit interval (I;I;¸)
and the space of actions A be the set f ¹ H; ¹ Tg, representing Head and Tail respectively.
Let the space of traits T be the unit interval I. Assume that the players' traits are
uniformly distributed on I; and thus let ® be the identity mapping on I and ½ = ¸.
We can interpret the trait of an individual players as normalized age (or complexion or
income). For concreteness, let us use age.
For any a 2 A and ¿ 2 M½(T £ A), let vi(a;¿) = ¡
R
T£A 1[0;i)£fag(t;x) d¿ for
all i 2 I, where 1C is the indicator function of set C.29 Let f be a strategy pro¯le
for the game, ¿ = ¸(®;f)¡1, ¿ ¹ H([0;i)) = ¸
¡
(®;f)¡1([0;i) £ f ¹ Hg)
¢
and ¿ ¹ T([0;i)) =
¸
¡
(®;f)¡1([0;i) £ f¹ Tg)
¢
. Namely, ¿ ¹ H([0;i)) (¿ ¹ T([0;i))) is the proportion of all players
younger than i who play Heads (Tails). It is easy to see that vi( ¹ H;¿) = ¡¿ ¹ H([0;i))
and vi(¹ T;¿) = ¡¿ ¹ T([0;i)). Hence, player i's optimal response is respectively Tail if
¿ ¹ H([0;i)) > ¿ ¹ T([0;i)), Head if ¿ ¹ T([0;i)) > ¿ ¹ H([0;i)), and Head or Tail if ¿ ¹ H([0;i)) =
¿ ¹ T([0;i)). It means that the ith player always tries to balance out those players younger
than him or her. If there are more younger players who play Heads (Tails), then player
i will play Tail (Head).
Suppose that f¤ is an equilibrium in pure strategies. Then for every i 2 I, the
respective sets of younger players who play Heads and Tails must have the same measure.
Let F = f¤¡1(f ¹ Hg) be the set of all the players who play Heads. Then the measurable set
F cuts through [0;i) into half for every i 2 I, which is impossible. The main conclusion
is summarized into the following claim, whose proof is given in the Appendix.
Claim 1. Let G be a function satisfying G(i) = (®(i);vi). Then, (1) G is a measurable
function from I to T £V(A;T;½), thus, a game which falls within the purview of De¯nition
29This payo® function is motivated by the example in Remark 3 of [42].
122; (2) there does not exist a Nash equilibrium for the game G.
We now show that the above game can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of
¯nite-player games, each of which has an exact Nash equilibrium.
Example 2: Fix a positive integer n and let In = fk=2n : k = 0;1;:::;2ng. Let ¸n
denote the counting measure on In, i.e., ¸n(i) = 1=(2n + 1) for every i 2 In. Let A =
f ¹ H; ¹ Tg be the set of actions. Let Tn = In, ®n : In ¡! Tn be ®n(i) = i and ½n = ¸n®¡1
n =
¸n. For any a 2 A and ¿n 2 M½n(Tn £ A), let vn
i (a;¿n) = ¡
R
Tn£A 1[0;i)£fag(t;x) d¿n.
Notice that when i = 0; vi(¢;¢) is identically zero. De¯ne Gn : In ¡! Tn £ V(A;Tn;½n) as
Gn(i) = (®n(i);vn
i ) for for all i 2 In. Given any a 2 A and any measurable function fn



















n : In ¡! A be f¤
n(k=2n) = ¹ H when k is even, and equals ¹ T otherwise. We will
show that f¤
n is a Nash equilibrium of Gn. Player 0 is always indi®erent between ¹ H and
¹ T: So, f¤












n(i) = ¹ H is a best response
for i. For player i = k=2n where k is odd, ¸n
¡
[0;i) \ f¡1








¹ T is the best response for i. Hence, f¤
n is a Nash equilibrium of Gn.
We note that the sequence Gn of games is simply a discrete version of the game
G. However, Gn has a Nash equilibrium while the limit game does not have a Nash
equilibrium.
We are now ready to turn to the resolution of the discrepancy between the limiting
and idealized limit cases.
4 Saturated Probability Spaces and Existence The-
orems
We now turn to the issue of an idealized limit game for which there exist Nash equilibria.
We shall show that the relevant condition for the atomless space of players' names is that
it be a saturated probability space, and that such a requirement is both su±cient and
necessary. We begin with the basic de¯nitions for the convenience of the reader.
The following de¯nition is taken from [24, De¯nition 5.1] and already discussed in
the introduction.
De¯nition 3. A probability space (I;I;¸) is said to be saturated if for any two Polish
spaces X and Y , any Borel probability measure ¿ 2 M(X £Y ) with marginal probability
13measure ¿X on X, and any measurable mapping g from (I;I;¸) to X with distribution
¿X, there exists a measurable mapping h : (I;I;¸) ¡! Y such that the measurable
mapping (g;h) : (I;I;¸) ¡! X £ Y has distribution ¿.
Analytically useful as this de¯nition is, it does not quite address the substantive property
that leads the saturation property to be both necessary and su±cient when dealing with
non-anonymous games with non-denumerable action sets. An equivalent characterization
presented in [24, Corollary 4.5] o®ers the clari¯cation. First, we need the following
notation for a restricted probability space. Given a probability space (I;I;¸), for any
subset S 2 I with ¸(S) > 0, denote by (S;IS;¸S) the probability space restricted to
S. Here IS := fS \ S0 : S0 2 Ig and ¸S is the probability measure re-scaled from
the restriction of ¸ to IS. A probability space is said to be countably generated if its ¾-
algebra can be generated by a countable number of subsets (modulo all the null subsets).
It is not countably generated if the ¾-algebra I can not be generated by any countable
number of subsets (modulo all the null subsets).30
Proposition 1. A probability space (I;I;¸) is saturated if and only if it is nowhere
countably generated, i.e., for any subset S 2 I with ¸(S) > 0, the restricted probability
space (S;IS;¸S) is not countably generated, modulo all the null subsets.31
This proposition stipulates that a saturated probability space admits as measurable
functions a richer variety of non-cooperative behavior. For example, the Lebesgue unit
interval, i.e., the interval [0;1] associated with the the ¾-algebra of Lebesgue measurable
sets and the Lebesgue measure, is a countably generated probability space; it is thus
not a saturated probability space. In comparison, any atomless Loeb probability space
is saturated. The genesis of the idea goes to Maharam's work in the forties whose
techniques can be used to show that a probability space is saturated if and only if its
measure algebra is a countable convex combination of measure algebras of uncountable
powers of the Borel ¾-algebra on [0;1]; see [20] for details. In any case, armed with this
intuition, we can present our ¯rst principal result.32
Theorem 1. Every large non-anonymous game with traits G : I ¡! T £ V(A;T;½) has a
Nash equilibrium if either of the following two (su±cient) conditions hold:
30That is, the least cardinality of the collection of subsets that generates I (modulo all the null
subsets) is greater than the cardinality of all the natural numbers, IN.
31This proposition is available in [24, Corollary 4.5]. Throughout the paper, we refer to results
previously available in the literature as \propositions." The reader is also warned about the proliferation
of terminology related to the saturation property: the condition is originally called @1-atomless in [24],
and subsequently referred to as nowhere separable, super-atomless and nowhere countably generated;
see [39] and his references.
32Note that we work with the standing hypothesis that the space of players' names (I;I;¸) is an
atomless probability space, that the common action set A is a compact metric space, and that T is a
Polish space endowed with a probability measure ½:
14(i) T and A are both countable spaces,
(ii) (I;I;¸) is a saturated probability space.
Proof: Given any ¿ 2 M½(T £ A), let the best response set B(i;¿) of player i be
B(i;¿) = argmaxa2Avi(a;¿);
where vi = G2(i) for all i 2 I. Since vi is continuous on A £ M½(T £ A), we can
appeal to Berge's maximum theorem to guarantee that B(i;¢) is upper hemicontinuous.
In particular, for any given (i;¿), B(i;¿) is a closed set. Furthermore, for each ¿ 2
M½(T £ A), since v(¢)(¢;¿) is a measurable function on I, and a continuous function on
A, we can apply measurable maximum theorem (see, for example, Theorem 18.19 in [3])
to assert that there exists a measurable selection from the correspondence B(¢;¿). Let
~ B(i;¿) = f®(i)g £ B(i;¿) for all i 2 I and for all ¿ 2 M½(T £ A) where ®(i) = G1(i)
for all i 2 I. It is easy to see that ~ B(i;¢) is also upper hemicontinuous on M½(T £ A)
for each i and ~ B(i;¿) is closed-valued for any given (i;¿). Denote the correspondence
~ B(¢;¿) : I ¡! T £A by ~ B¿. Now de¯ne a correspondence © : M½(T £ A) ¡! M½(T £
A) by letting ©(¿) = D ~ B¿ where D ~ B¿ = f¸ ~ f¡1 : ~ f is a measurable selection of ~ B¿g:
We now show that © is a nonempty, closed and convex valued, upper hemicontinuous
correspondence from a non-empty convex compact subset of a locally convex space into
itself. For any given ¿ 2 M½(T £ A), there exists a measurable selection f : I ¡! A
where f(i) 2 B(i;¿). Let h(i) = (®(i);f(i)) for all i 2 I. It is clear that h(i) is a
measurable selection of ~ B¿ and ¸h¡1 2 M½(T £ A). Thus, © is nonempty-valued. If
either (i) or (ii) is satis¯ed, we can apply Proposition A.P1 in the Appendix to assert
that © is convex also. Moreover, because ~ B¿ is closed-valued, hence, compact-valued,
and ~ B(i;¢) is upper hemicontinuous on M½(T £ A), we can apply Proposition A. P2
and Proposition A. P4 in the Appendix respectively to assert that © is closed and upper
hemicontinuous. Thus, we can apply the Fan-Glicksberg ¯xed-point theorem to assert
that there exists a ¿¤ 2 ©(¿¤), and thus, a measurable selection f¤ : I ¡! A such that
¿¤ = ¸(®;f¤)¡1. It is clear that f¤ is a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 1: It is clear that the procedure that relates the conventional form of a large
non-anonymous game to the reformulated version studied here, and delineated at the
end of Section 2, can be used to derive as straightforward corollaries the principal results
of [30] and [22]. The interested reader can also check that the compactness of the action
set A can be relaxed with less restrictive assumptions that allow each player to choose
his action from a compact subset of the complete countable metric space, as shown in
[50].
15Remark 2: Examples showing that a large non-anonymous game does not have a Nash
equilibrium if the action set is uncountable are by now well-known; see [32] for refer-
ences. These examples can be used to show that Theorem 1(i) is false if the countability
hypothesis on A is relaxed without any additional assumptions. What is more impor-
tant, of course, is that the result does not extend to the case where the trait space T
is uncountable even with a ¯nite action set. Indeed, the example discussed in the last
section is based on an action set with only two elements.
Next, we turn to the necessity of saturated spaces when Nash equilibria exist in
large non-anonymous games. The relevant benchmark result is due to [28, Theorem 4.7].
Proposition 2. Let (I;I;¸) be an atomless probability space, and A an uncountable
compact metric space. Then (I;I;¸) is saturated if and only if every game G0 in terms
of De¯nition 1 with player space (I;I;¸) and action space A has a Nash equilibrium.
We can now present our main result on the necessity of saturated spaces then Nash
equilibria exist in our reformulation of large games, namely, large non-anonymous games
with traits.
Theorem 2. An atomless probability space (I;I;¸) is saturated if and only if every large
non-anonymous game with traits G : I ¡! T £ V(A;T;½) has a Nash equilibrium provided
one of the following two conditions hold
(i) A is uncountable,
(ii) T is uncountable and ½ is atomless.
Proof: Suppose that (I;I;¸) is saturated. For both (i) and (ii), by Theorem 1, there
exists a Nash equilibrium.
We now prove the necessary parts. First, suppose that condition (i) holds but
(I;I;¸) is not saturated. Thus, by Proposition 2, when A is an uncountable compact
metric space, there must exist a game in terms of De¯nition 1 with (I;I;¸) as the name
space that does not have any Nash equilibrium. Let this game be G0. Thus, G0 is a
measurable function from I to UA such that there does not exist any measurable function
f : I ¡! A that satis¯es for ¸-almost all i 2 I, ui(f(i);¸f¡1) ¸ ui(a;¸f¡1) for all a 2 A,
where ui = G0.
Let G be a function from I to T £ V(A;T;½) such that for all i 2 I, ¸G
¡1
1 = ½ and
G2(i) = vi where vi is de¯ned as vi(a;¿) = ui(a;¿A) with ¿A being the marginal of ¿ on
A for any a 2 A and any ¿ 2 V(A;T;½). It is easy to see that G is a non-anonymous game
with traits that satis¯es condition (i). Now suppose that any game with the structure
described in Theorem 2 with condition (i) has a Nash equilibrium. Then there must
16exist a Nash equilibrium f¤ for this constructed game G. That is, there is a measurable






¡1) for all a 2 A:
Then, by the construction of the game G, the measurable function f¤ also satis¯es, for




¤¡1) for all a 2 A:
This is a contradiction. Hence, (I;I;¸) must be saturated if condition (i) holds.
Now suppose condition (ii) holds but (I;I;¸) is not saturated. Suppose that every
game with traits under condition (ii) has a Nash equilibrium. However, Lemma 2 in the
Appendix shows that when T is uncountable, ½ is atomless, and A = f¡1;1g, there is
a large non-anonymous game with traits G : I ¡! T £ V(A;T;½) which does not have any
Nash equilibrium. This is a contradiction. Thus, (I;I;¸) must be saturated as well if
condition (ii) holds.
5 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies: A Relationship
So far, we have had no occasion to emphasize the distinction between pure and mixed
strategies of a large non-anonymous game, be it with or without traits. Indeed, as
noted in the introduction, the interest in a large game arises precisely from the fact
that under an attendant externality notion summarizing the state of society's plays,
such games posses Nash equilibria without any linear structure on the (common) action
set. For games with traits, such existence theorems have been presented in the previous
section based on De¯nition 2 that simply involves a measurable function from the space
of players' names (I;I;¸) to the set of actions A: However, in games with complete
information, as are considered in this paper, rationality leads one to investigate strategies
in which players form probability distributions over the actions of other players, and then
take actions in keeping with expectations with respect to such distributions.33 As we
shall see, the basic notions, once formulated correctly, take a particularly satisfactory
form.
For the convenience of the reader, and also given the proliferation of confusing
terminologies, it is easiest to begin with a taxonomy presented in [36] in the context of
¯nite-player games with incomplete information, one that is heavily in°uenced by earlier
33For a discussion of Bayesian rationality and its manifestation as a correlated equilibrium in the
context of ¯nite games with incomplete information, see [11].
17work of Aumann's. In the context of such games, they write:
Each player i observes an informational variable (or type ti) whose values lie in some
complete separable metric space Ti: After observing his type, player i selects an
action ai from some compact metric space Ai of feasible actions. The conventional
analysis of games involves three types of strategies: pure, mixed and behavioral.
A pure strategy is a measurable function pi : Ti ¡! Ai: This has the interpretation
that when player i learns his type ti; he selects the action pi(ti): Aumann has ob-
served that to de¯ne a mixed strategy properly (when Ti is \large") a randomizing
device must be introduced for each player.34 Thus, let ~ si be uniformly distributed
on [0;1]: A mixed strategy for player i is a measurable function ¾ : [0;1]£Ti ¡! Ai:
The interpretation is that when player i observes his type ti and his randomizing
variable si; he selects the action ¾(si;ti): Let B(Ai) be the collection of Borel sub-
sets of Ai. A behavioral strategy is a function ¯i : B(Ai) £ Ti ¡! [0;1] with these
two properties: (i) For every B 2 B(Ai); the function ¯i(B;¢) : Ti ¡! [0;1] is
measurable, (ii) for every ti 2 Ti; the function ¯i(¢;ti) : B(Ai) ¡! [0;1] is a prob-
ability measure.35 The interpretation of a behavioral strategy is that when player
i observes ti; he selects an action in Ai according to the measure ¯i(¢;ti):
This extended quotation serves as a point of departure for the development of
analogous notions, and in particular, the following formal complement to De¯nition 1
above for a large game without traits.
De¯nition 4. A Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies of G0 is a measurable function
h¤ : I ¡! M(A), with the latter being endowed Borel ¾-algebra generated by the weak

























for all º 2 M(A).36
However before enlisting the conceptual vocabulary of [36], and its attendant tax-
onomy, to the context of a large non-anonymous game, with or without traits, some
preliminary discussion is warranted. There is a technical similarity in that in the notion
34The relevant paper referred to here is [9] and the relevant passage from this paper is quoted in [36,
p. 624]. Also see the introduction to [10].
35From a technical point of view, this is nothing but a transition probability in standard probability
theory.
36Note that the measurability of the mapping h¤ is equivalent to the measurability of h¤(¢)(B) : I ¡!
[0;1]; for any given B 2 A; see, for example, Lemma 1 in [23]. The societal aggregate
R
I h¤(j)d¸ is
well-de¯ned as a probability measure whose measure on any given B 2 A is
R
I h¤(j)(B)d¸.
18of a pure strategy, as used in De¯nitions 1 and 2, and in that of a behavioral strategy in
De¯nition 4, one simply substitutes the space of players' names (I;I;¸) for the ¯nite set
of all the players, and the common action set A for the individual action set Ai: However
it is important to be clear that from an interpretive point of view, which is to say, the
game-theoretic substantive register, the similarity is facile at best, and misleading at
worst. The point is that we investigate a game with complete information in which the
type of a player i is represented simply by his name i in a game without traits, and by
the pair (i;®(i)) 2 I £ T; and, in either case, is completely known. To be more speci¯c,
whereas Milgrom and Weber deal with the strategy of an individual player, be they pure,
mixed or behavioral, our transcribing of these notions37 in the forms of De¯nitions 1, 2
and 4 concern strategy pro¯les, which is to say that they pertain to the society at large
rather than to an individual player. Since there has been some confounding of this issue,
a further elucidation is useful.
The interesting issue here relates to the externality notion that is involved. Each
player chooses a probability distribution on the common action space, and randomizes
over his payo® with respect to such a distribution taking as given the \aggregate" of the
distributions of all the other players in the game.
This notion of a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies was used by Schmeidler in
the context of large games but without the attendant externality notion. In a setting with
a ¯nite number of actions embedded in the unit-simplex of a ¯nite-dimensional Euclidean
space, Schmeidler investigated Nash equilibria of large games where individual payo®s
depend on the elements of the simplex and the entire pro¯le of actions. He referred to
these equilibria as equilibria in mixed strategies, and used a \puri¯cation" argument to
show the existence of a Nash equilibrium as in De¯nition 1 above.38 Invoking [10], [38]
argued as follows:
The failure of the law of large numbers for a continuum of independent randomiza-
tions implies that Schmeidler's (1973) concept of a measure-valued pro¯le function
in equilibrium might not coincide with the concept of a mixed strategies equilib-
rium of a nonatomic game. It casts some doubt on the signi¯cance of Schmeidler's
concept of equilibrium for a nonatomic game.39
In this connection it is important to note that Schmeidler's primary interest was in
showing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and his use of the concept
37This is of course not to suggest that this transcription in the context of a large game without traits,
as is conventional treated and surveyed in [32], either necessarily follows [36] or is novel to this paper.
38Rath's direct proof that circumvents this procedure is by now well-known; see [32] for details and
discussion.
39See the abstract and the ¯rst paragraph of the introduction in [38]; also [37].
19of a Nash equilibria in behavioral strategies was simply a technical device to accomplish
this.40 As such, one does not quite know what to make of the suggestion relating to
signi¯cance. To repeat, the point is that in the game formulated by Schmeidler, and
in games with more general action sets, as reported in [32], a mixed strategy is very
much in the classical footsteps of Nash and Fan-Glicksberg, with the notion of a mixed
strategy pro¯le simply extending from a ¯nite-player setting to one with a continuum of
players.41 [38] and his followers take the Bayesian notion of a mixed strategy, as de¯ned
by Aumann and others for games with incomplete information, and apply it to such
games of complete information, and conceive of a so-called problem of consistency and
reconciliation that is not a problem to begin with.
The issue then is an appropriate de¯nition of the notion of a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium for a large non-anonymous game, one that accommodates a continuum of
independent randomizations and joint measurability. It is especially here that we break
new ground, but before turning to it, we return to Milgrom and Weber.
These conventional characterizations of strategies are not well suited to our pur-
poses. Instead we de¯ne a distributional strategy for player i as a probability
measure on B(Ti) ­ B(Ai) for which the marginal distribution on Ti is the given
probability distribution. In the case where T1 is uncountable, it was observed by
Aumann that a mixed strategy cannot be acceptably de¯ned as a measure on the
set of pure strategies. Our approach of de¯ning a (distributional) strategy as a
measure on Ti £ Ai providing another way of avoiding measurability problems.
And so the question is: \what is this measurability problem"? In the notation being
followed here, [9, pp. 507-508] writes:
A mixed strategy, then, should be a probability measure on A
Ti
i ; [the space of
measurable functions from Ti to Ai] the latter having been endowed with an ap-
propriate measurable structure R: But as we have shown elsewhere there is no
structure R for which this is so; no structure on A
Ti
i ; is \appropriate"! 42
As brought out in the ¯rst quote from Milgrom and Weber, a mixed strategy for
player i is a function of two variables: the realization of the randomizing variable si and
the player's type ti: In other words, a process, de¯ned over [0;1]£Ti: There is no reason
for Milgrom and Weber to work with a mixed strategy: their equilibrium notion requires
40In private correspondence, David Schmeidler has observed to the authors that his reference to the
\combination of strategies as a T-strategy, and not as a mixed strategy" was a considered one given
Aumann's earlier usage.
41See [32] and their references.
42This point is exposited in [8], having been announced in [6] and detailed in [7].
20that only the distribution of the players' actions enter as arguments in the payo®s of
each individual player, and therefore allows them to work with a distributional strategy
for each player, represent it as a disintegrated behavioral strategy, and then with the
assumption of a ¯nite action space, purify this distintegration to a pure strategy. Indeed,
[40] make no use of distributional strategies, and neither do [30, 31] for an identical game-
theoretic situation.43
It is in the context of a large non-anonymous game, with or without traits, that
the \measurability problem" arises in the notion of a mixed strategy pro¯le. This is a
process de¯ned over a sample space that consolidates all the independent randomizations
into one \large" space ­ and takes this space and the space of players' names into the
space of common actions. In short, to construct a sample space (­;F;P) such that a
mixed strategy pro¯le can be conceived as a measurable function F : I £ ­ ¡! A such
that for any realization ! 2 ­; we obtain a pure strategy F(!;¢) : I ¡! A; and for any
two players' i and j in I; the random variables F(¢;i) and F(¢;j) are independent. It is
this independence that goes to the heart of non-cooperative game theory { the players
are not coordinating their randomizations and acting \out of concert" so to speak. It is
this that causes the \measurability problem," a di±culty whose sharpest articulation is
furnished by a result that we develop next.
For any two probability spaces (I;I;¸) and (­;F;P), we write I ­ F as the usual
product ¾-algebra (including all the null subsets) generated by fS £ T : S 2 I;T 2 Fg,
and write ¸ ­ P as the product probability measure on I ­ F. Given any mapping F
from I £ ­ to a Polish space X, for any i 2 I and ! 2 ­, let Fi denote the marginal
mapping F(i;¢) on ­, and F! the marginal mapping F(¢;!) on I. The following concept
is from [44, 46].
De¯nition 5. A process F is said to be essentially pairwise independent if for ¸-almost
all i 2 I, Fi and Fi0 are independent for ¸-almost all i0 2 I.44
We shall construct an essentially pairwise independent process as follows. Let [0;1]
be the unit interval endowed with the Borel ¾-algebra B[0;1] and the uniform distribution.
For an atomless probability space (I;I;¸), let ­ = [0;1]I represent the space of all
functions from I to the unit interval [0;1]. By the Kolmogorov's extension theorem, we
can consider the continuum product probability space (­;F0;P 0), where F0 is the ¾-
algebra generated by cylinders of the form f! 2 ­ : !(i) 2 Bg for all B 2 B[0;1], and P 0
43All this is now routine with the clari¯cation in [29] and its further extensions by Loeb-Sun; also see
[34, Remark 4]. Distintegrations in this context seem to have been ¯rst emphasized in a 1989 paper of
Khan's, see [32].
44Given that (I;I;¸) is an atomless probability space, essential pairwise independence is more general
than the usual pairwise and mutual independence.
21is the continuum product probability measure on (­;F0). Next de¯ne ¼ to be a process
from I £ ­ to [0;1] by letting ¼(i;!) := !(i) for all (i;!) 2 I £ ­. Here the marginal
function ¼i is the i-th coordinate function on (­;F0;P 0). It is clear that ¼i induces the
uniform distribution on [0;1] for any i 2 [0;1], and ¼i;¼j are independent for i 6= j.
Accordingly, the process ¼ is an essentially pairwise independent process. However, it
is well-known that this process ¼ is not I ­ F
0-measurable.45 Indeed, as shown in the
following proposition, the essential pairwise independence and the joint measurability of
a process with respect to the usual product ¾-algebra are never compatible with each
other except for the trivial case that almost all random variables are essentially constant.
Proposition 3. Let f be a function from I £ ­ to a Polish space X: If f is jointly
measurable on the product probability space (I £­;I ­F;¸­P), and if f is essentially
pairwise independent, then, for ¸-almost all i 2 I, fi is a constant random variable.46
And so, with this result, we have a precise and clear articulation of the \measura-
bility problem": the usual continuum product guaranteed by Kolomogorov construction
will simply not work.47 But this does not imply that that we need to relinquish the con-
ceptual vocabulary; it simply necessitates extending the usual product space. In other
words, to overcome the above non-compatibility problem of measurability and indepen-
dence, we need to work with the framework of Fubini extension. It is an enrichment
of the usual product probability space on which the Fubini property is retained. The
following de¯nition is taken from [46, De¯nitions 2.2 and 5.1].
De¯nition 6. A probability space (I £ ­;W;Q) is said to be a Fubini extension of the
usual product probability space (I £ ­;I ­ F;¸ ­ P) if for any real-valued Q-integrable
function F on (I £ ­;W),
(i) Fi is P-integrable on (­;F;P) for ¸-almost all i 2 I, and F! is ¸-integrable on
(I;I;¸) for P-almost all ! 2 ­;
(ii)
R
­ Fi dP and
R
I F! d¸ are integrable on (I;I;¸) and (­;F;P) respectively, in ad-
dition,
R













A Fubini extension (I £ ­;W;Q) is said to be rich if there is a W-measurable process
G from I £ ­ to the interval [0;1], such that G is essentially pairwise independent, and
45See [44, 48] for references to Doob's consideration of the special case that (I;I;¸) is the Lebesgue
unit interval.
46See [46, Proposition 2.1]. The result is valid even when ¸ has atoms since the essential pairwise
independence condition implies the essential constancy of the random variables fi for ¸-almost all i 2 A;
and therefore on the atom.
47For an extended discussion that also includes di±culties of working with ¯nitely-additive measures,
see [46, Section 6].
22Gi induces the uniform distribution on [0;1] for ¸-almost all i 2 I. We say that such a
rich Fubini extension is based on (I;I;¸), and the process G witnesses the richness of
the Fubini extension.48
In a Fubini extension (I £­;W;Q), note that the marginal probability measures of
Q on (I;I) and (­;F) are ¸ and P respectively. To re°ect this property, we follow the
attendant literature and denote the Fubini extension (I£­;W;Q) by (I£­;I £ F;¸£
P).
Next, we connect the existence of a rich Fubini extension to the saturation property
of a probability space which is formalized in De¯nition 3, and with which we have been
working so far. The following result is from [46, Proposition 5.6] and [39, Theorem 1]
and summarized as [49, Corollary 1].
Proposition 4. The probability space (I;I;¸) is saturated if and only if there is a rich
Fubini extension based on it.
Note that this result is phrased in terms of the single probability space (I;I;¸);
and whereas this is no impediment for the su±ciency part of the result, the requisite
sample space has to be constructed for the necessity part. And so the necessity claim,
when elaborated, comes down to asserting the existence of a probability space (­;F;P)
extending (­;F0;P 0), as de¯ned after De¯nition 5 above, such that there exists a rich
Fubini extension (I £­;I £ F;¸£P) on which the process of coordinate functions ¼ is
I £ F-measurable and witnesses the richness of the Fubini extension.49 Finally, we also
record a convenient universality property of a rich Fubini extension based on a saturated
probability space. A rich Fubini extension satis¯es the universality property in the sense
that one can construct processes on it with essentially pairwise independent random
variables that have any given variety of distributions on a general Polish space. The
following result is available in [46, Proposition 5.3].
Proposition 5. Let (I £ ­;I £ F;¸ £ P) be a rich Fubini extension, X be a Polish
space, and f a measurable mapping from (I;I;¸) to M(X): Then there exists an I £ F-
measurable process F : I £ ­ ! X such that the process F is essentially pairwise
independent and f(i) is the induced distribution by Fi, for ¸-almost all i 2 I.
This now formalizes the fact that, unlike the Lebesgue unit interval, saturated
probability spaces are hospitable to independence and measurability, and that too in a
48For the existence of a rich Fubini extension, see Theorem 6.2 of [44], Theorem 5.6 of [46], Theorem
1 of [48] and of [39].
49This is precisely the content of [49, Lemma 1] who then use it, in conjunction with their Lemma 4
to prove their Corollary 1, reported as Lemma 1 here.
23strong sense that they admit processes whose random variables have a full and arbitrarily-
given variety of distributions.50
The next result is taken from Corollary 2.9 of [46], which provides a version of the
ELLN in the framework of Fubini extension.
Proposition 6. Assume that (I £ ­;I £ F;¸ £ P) is a Fubini extension. If F is an
essentially pairwise independent and I £ F-measurable process, then the sample distri-
bution ¸F ¡1
! is the same as the distribution (¸ £ P)F ¡1 for P-almost all ! 2 ­.
Having seen the technical necessity of moving from a single probability space to a
product, we now turn to the game-theoretic substance. First, consider any large non-
anonymous game G0 : I ¡! UA that ¯ts De¯nition 1. From now on, let (I £ ­;I £
F;¸£P) be a rich Fubini extension of the product space (I £­;I ­F;¸­P). For the
¯rst time in this paper in terms of the formalities, we shift from the nomenclature of a
strategy to that of a strategy pro¯le.51
De¯nition 7. A mixed strategy pro¯le of a game G0 is a I £ F-measurable function
g : I £ ­ ¡! A where the process g is assumed to be essentially pairwise independent.52
A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of G0 is a mixed strategy pro¯le g¤, such that for













for all random variables ´ : ­ ¡! A.
And now that we have developed the necessary background to inquire into the rela-
tionship between a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and one in behavioral strategies,
we can present the following result whose proof is natural and straightforward.53
Theorem 3. The following equivalence holds for a large non-anonymous game G0:
(i) Every Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies induces a Nash equilibrium in behavio-
rial strategies, and
50This arbitrary nature is only modulated by the fact that the distributions are stitched together by
a measurable function; the function f in Proposition 5.
51The attentive reader has surely noted that we could have been explicitly mentioned the notion of
a pure strategy pro¯le in De¯nitions 1 and 2, and a behavioral strategy pro¯le in De¯nition 4 but chose
not to do so.
52Though the Lebesgue unit interval itself cannot be the player space, it is shown in [48] that some
rich extension of it can the player space.
53In the statement of the theorem, we have not formally de¯ned the words induce and lift: we feel it
would be pedantic to do so given that their meaning is clear from the context, and especially from the
rather straightforward proof.
24(ii) every Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies can be lifted to a Nash equilibrium
in mixed strategies.
Proof: (i) Suppose g¤ is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of a game G0. Let
h¤(i) = Pg
¤¡1









i d¸ = ¸g
¤¡1
! : (3)
Because g¤ is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, (2) holds for g¤. It is clear that
for any random variable ´ : ­ ¡! A, P´¡1 2 M(A). Moreover, given that (I £ ­;I £
F;¸ £ P) is rich, P is atomless. Hence, for any º 2 M(A), there exists a random
variable ´ : ­ ¡! A such that º = P´¡1. Thus, by (3) and the change of variable
theorem, (2) is equivalent to (1) for h¤ where h¤(i) = Pg
¤¡1
i for all i 2 I. By De¯nition
4, the measurable function h¤ is a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies for the game
G0.
(ii) Now suppose h¤ is a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies of a game G0.
That is, h¤ is a measurable function from I to M(A) that satis¯es (1). Given that
(I £ ­;I £ F;¸ £ P) is a rich Fubini extension, by Proposition 5, there is a I £ F-
measurable process g¤ from I£­ to A such that g¤ is an essentially pairwise independent
process, and the distribution Pg
¤¡1
i is the given distribution h¤(i) for ¸-almost all i 2 I.
By the ELLN, (3) holds for such a g¤ and h¤. Thus, this I £ F-measurable process g¤
from I £ ­ to A also satis¯es (2) by (1) and the change of variables theorem. Hence, g¤
is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for the same game G0.
The remainder of this section is an elaboration of these concepts to the setting of
a large non-anonymous game with traits. In this context, we have a richer notion of
externalities, one that embodies distributions over actions as well as over traits. We
begin with de¯nitions analogous to these of De¯nition 4 and De¯nition 7.
De¯nition 8. A behavioral strategy pro¯le of a large non-anonymous game with traits G
is a measurable function h : I ¡! M(A); with the latter being endowed Borel ¾-algebra
generated by the weak topology. A Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies of G is a

















for all º 2 M(A), where ±t is the distribution on T with mass one on some t 2 T.
De¯nition 9. A mixed strategy pro¯le of a large non-anonymous game with traits G is a
I £ F-measurable function g : I £­ ¡! A, where g is essentially pairwise independent.















for all random variables ´ : ­ ¡! A.
We are now ready to show the relationship between a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies and one in behavioral strategies for games with traits.
Theorem 4. Theorem 3 holds for G; a large non-anonymous game with traits.
Proof: Suppose g¤ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a large non-anonymous game
with traits G. (5) holds for such a g¤ of the game G. Let h¤
i = Pg
¤¡1
i for all i 2 I. As
the random variables g¤
i are essentially pairwise independent, it is clear that the random
variables (®(i);g¤
i(!)) are essentially pairwise independent. Thus we can appeal to the

















which shows that (4) holds for the pro¯le h¤ in which h¤
i = Pg
¤¡1
i for all i 2 I by the
change of variables theorem and the fact that P is atomless. Hence, by De¯nition 8, h
is a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies for the game G.
Now suppose h¤ is a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies of G. That is to
say, (4) holds for h¤. By arguments similar to (ii) in the proof of Theorem 3, together
with (6) and (4), we can then lift h¤ to an essentially pairwise independent process g¤
where Pg¤¡1 = h¤(i) for ¸-almost all i 2 I such that g¤ is a Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies of G.
6 Mixed and Pure Strategies: An Ex-Post Relation-
ship
In a section titled \large games with independent idiosyncratic shocks", [32] observed
that the notion of externalities in the form of a distribution of the actions of all players {
a distinguishing characteristic of the theory of large games { allows one to make a rather
novel claim: this is the assertion that in a setting of idiosyncratic shocks, \in equilibrium,
societal responses do not depend on a particular sample realization, and each player is
justi¯ed in ignoring other players' risks."54 We begin this section by transcribing Theorem
54See Section 11 in [32]. The quote is taken from Section 11.3 on page 1792 where we substitute
\player" for \agent." In this connection, also see Assumption C and its discussion in Cremer and
267 in [32] in the vocabulary of a rich Fubini extension developed in [46] and used essentially
in this paper. We begin with the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 10. A large non-anonymous game with idiosyncratic uncertainty is a mea-
surable function GU from (I £­;I £F;¸£P) to UA such that GU is essentially pairwise
independent.
We can now present
Proposition 7. Let GU be a large non-anonymous game with idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Then there is a process f : I £ ­ ¡! A such that f is a Nash equilibrium of the game
GU, such that the random strategies f(i;¢) are essentially pairwise independent, and for
P-almost all ! 2 ­; f(¢;!) is an equilibrium of the large game GU(¢;!) with constant
societal distribution (¸ £ P)f¡1:
A two-line proof of this proposition is furnished in [32]. The basic idea is straightforward.
One can regard the game GU as a large non-anonymous game modeled on the space of
players' names to be the joint space I£­; and given joint measurability on such a space,
deduce the existence of a Nash equilibrium g : T £ ­ ¡! A from the standard result.
This is to assert that there exists a measurable function such that
G
U
(i;!)(g(i;!); (¸ £ P)g
¡1) ¸ G
U
(i;!)(a; (¸ £ P)g
¡1) for all a 2 A:
The point is that this measurable function is a selection from the set-valued process
(t;!) ¡! F(t;!) = argmaxa2AG
U
(t;!)(a; (¸ £ P)g
¡1):
And we can now ¯nish the proof by appealing to the following proposition (which is
Theorem 2 of [45]) and to the ELLN as stated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 8. Let F be a set-valued process from I £­ to a complete separable metric
space A. Assume that F(i;¢) are essentially pairwise independent. Let g be a selection of
F with distribution ¹. Then there is another selection f of F such that the distribution
of f is ¹; and f(t;¢) is essentially pairwise independent.
And so rather than the proof, it is the interpretation of the theorem that is of
interest. The context is one of exogenous uncertainty whereby the individual payo®s, as
well as the individual randomized strategies, are independent, and the theorem rigorously
develops the intuition that once uncertainty is resolved, a player has no incentive to
depart ex-post from her optimal strategy taken in the ex-ante game when she ¯nds
Mclean (1985, p. 346); also Footnote 48 below.
27herself in the realized ex-post game. In this connection, but in the context of a large but
¯nite games, [27, p. 1632] writes:
A particular modeling di±culty of noncooperative game theory is the sensitivity of
Nash equilibrium to the rules of the game, e.g., the order of the players' moves and
the information structure. Since such details are often not available to the modeler
or even to the players of the game, equilibrium prediction may be unreliable. For
this purpose, we de¯ne a Nash equilibrium of a game to be extensively robust55 if
it remains a Nash equilibrium in all extensive versions of the simultaneous-move
game. Extensive robustness means in particular that an equilibrium must be ex-
post Nash. Even with perfect hindsight knowledge of the types and selected actions
of all of his opponents, no player regrets, or has an incentive to revise, his own
selected action.
One can look on the dependence of the payo®s on the space ­ in Proposition 7 as the
proxy for the variety of phenomena emphasized by Kalai and not explicitly modeled.56
To be sure, what makes Proposition 7 work is the existence of a rich Fubini ex-
tension and the ELLN. But the point can be sharpened still if rather than work with
a large game with idiosyncratic uncertainty GU; one works with a deterministic non-
anonymous large game as in De¯nition 1. In this case, the uncertainty underlying a
mixed strategy arises only from the uncertainty regarding the moves, randomized or
otherwise, of everyone else' plays. To put the matter another way, a natural question
concerns the possibility of such a claim in situations when there is no exogenous para-
metric uncertainty, but one introduced as a result of players' playing mixed strategies
based on independent randomizations, as be¯ts a non-cooperative game setting. If all
these independent randomizations can be consolidated in \one large" space ­ with the
mixed strategy pro¯le again being a process from I £ ­ to the space of actions, we are
back in the situation considered in [32], but with the underlying space of uncertainty be-
ing generated only from the independent randomized strategies of the players. One can
then again ask whether each player is justi¯ed in ignoring other players' risks and has no
incentive to depart ex-post from her optimal strategy taken in the ex-ante game when all
the randomizations of each player have been individually realized. In other words, this
is to ask, in the terminology adopted by [27], whether a mixed strategy equilibrium has
55[27, p. 1632] emphasizes, \This is a new notion of robustness, di®erent from other robustness notions
used in economics or game theory. While of course accepting the validity of this statement, one can
usefully connect it to [18, p. 347] who write \Then we utilize an equilibrium concept, called ex-post
Nash equilibrium, which states that, after seeing the bids of others, buyers will not want to revise their
bids."
56Referring to extensive versions of the simultaneous-move game, Kalai refers to \wide °exibility in
the order of players' moves, as well as information leakage, commitment and revision possibilities, cheap
talk, and more."
28an ex-post puri¯cation. Taking this terminology, and Kalai's approximate result as their
point of departure, [17] investigate approximate existence issues concerning a \Bayesian
equilibrium in pure strategies that is also expost stable." Since the question is being
posed in a deterministic large non-anonymous game, an a±rmative answer is even easier
to obtain than in the situation considered in Proposition 7 above. The de¯nition of the
ex-post property of a mixed strategy pro¯le of a game, with or without traits, is provided
as follows.
De¯nition 11. A mixed strategy pro¯le g¤ of a game is said to have the ex-post Nash
property if for P-almost all ! 2 ­, g¤
! is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the same
game with the empirical action distribution ¸g¤¡1
! .
And now we can present the following benchmark result for games without traits
G0.
Theorem 5. A mixed strategy pro¯le of G0 is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies if
and only if it has ex-post Nash property.
Proof: Suppose g¤ is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. We shall show that g¤
has ex-post Nash property. Towards this end, ¯rst note that by the ELLN as stated in













i (¢)d¸. Because g¤ is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, (2) holds.








ui (´(!);»)dP for all random variables ´ : ­ ¡! A;






By the Fubini property of a Fubini extension, we have, for P-almost all ! 2 ­, ¸-almost
























29This means, for P-almost all ! 2 ­, g¤
! is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and therefore,
g¤ has the ex-post Nash property.
Now, suppose that a mixed strategy pro¯le g has ex-post Nash property, which is












By (7) and the Fubini property of a Fubini extension, we have, for ¸-almost all i 2 I,
















Hence, for any random variable ´ : ­ ¡! A, we have, for ¸-almost all i 2 I, P-almost
































dP; for any random variable ´ : ­ ¡! A.
This veri¯es that g is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
As mentioned above, Kalai works with an increasing sequence of large but ¯nite
games and emphasizes an approximate ex-post Nash notion and an equicontinuity prop-
erty of payo®s that plays no role in the result presented here. However, his discussion of
the property itself is illuminating.57
An immediate consequence of the ex-post Nash property is a puri¯cation property
in large games. First, for normal-form games the ex-post Nash property provides
stronger conclusions than Schmeidler's (1973) on the role of pure strategy equilibria
in large anonymous games. Working in the limit with a continuum of players,
Schmeidler shows that every \mixed strategy" equilibrium may be \puri¯ed." This
means that for any mixed strategy equilibrium one can construct a pure strategy
equilibrium with the same individual payo®s. The ex-post Nash theorem ... shows
(asymptotically) that in large semi-anonymous games there is no need to purify
since it is done for us automatically by the laws of large numbers.58 So every mixed
strategy may be thought of as a \self-purifying device."
The point is that these words go with, and underscore, Proposition 7. The technical
vocabulary which constitutes Theorem 5 presented above, and which delivers what needs
57See, for example, [27, Lemma 6.1] and related discussion.
58[27] has no asymptotic analog of the equivalence result as stated in Theorem 5.
30to be substantively delivered, was simply not available to [38] and to [27].59
We now turn to large non-anonymous games with traits G:
Theorem 6. Theorem 5 holds for G; a large non-anonymous game with traits.
Proof: For any given mixed strategy pro¯le g of G; let G : I £ ­ ¡! T £ A be a
function satisfying G(i;!) = (®(i);gi(!)). It is easy to see that G is an essentially


















Suppose g¤ is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for G. That is, (5) holds for
g¤. Let »0 =
R
I ±®(i) ­ Pg
¤¡1











0)dP for all random variable ´ : ­ ¡! A:
Hence, for ¸-almost all i 2 I, P-almost all ! 2 ­, vi(g¤
i(!);»0) = maxa2A vi(a;»0): By
the Fubini property of a Fubini extension, for P-almost all ! 2 ­, ¸-almost all i 2 I,
vi(g¤
!(i);»0) = maxa2A vi(a;»0): Therefore, by the ELLN, for P-almost all ! 2 ­, for










This means for P-almost all ! 2 ­, g¤
! is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, which ensures
that g¤ has the ex-post Nash property.
Now, suppose that there is a mixed strategy pro¯le g of G has ex-post Nash property.
By arguments similar to the second paragraph in the proof of Theorem 5 and the above
argument, it is easy to check that g is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of the same
game G.
59In this connection, [27, Footnote 11] is confusing. This states, \As Schmeidler points out in his
paper, it is di±cult to de¯ne a \real mixed strategy" equilibrium due to failings of law of large numbers
in the case of continuously many random variables." As discussed above, the problem in Schmeidler's
paper is simply of nomenclature: he refers to what we (and [36]) are calling a behavioral strategy as a
mixed strategy. In particular he has no reference to the law of large numbers or to the independence
condition. In fact his statement that \in many real gamelike situations a mixed strategy has no meaning"
refers to di±culties in reality rather than those for modeling.
317 An Illustrative Result for Large but Finite Games
Theorems 1 to 6 presented above all concern an idealized limit game based on a saturated
probability space interpreted as a space of player's names (the thrust of the word non-
anonymous in the various de¯nitions). A traditional question in economic theory, dating
at least to the late sixties, is the relevance of these results to a ¯nite-agent setting, in
the ¯rst instance, and to a large but ¯nite set-up in the second. In short, this is to ask
for the asymptotic implementation, with or without speeds of convergence, of the limit
results.60 The answer to this is clear once one appreciates that the saturation property
of a probability space, as formalized in De¯nition 3 above, is shared by atomless Loeb
probability spaces, and therefore, by Loeb counting spaces.61 However, once the results
are pushed down to a setting where a Loeb counting space renders service as a space
of player's names instead of a general saturated probability space, the methodological
procedures are well-laid out and well-understood since the comprehensive surveys of [4],
and essentially go back to Brown-Robinson (see [4]: one pushes down the Loeb space
results to a result for a nonstandard internal game, and then, under the \tightness"
hypothesis, transfers to a setting of large but ¯nite games. It would be tedious to
present asymptotic implementations of each of the eight theorems, and we only present
a translation of Theorem 1 (ii) for illustration and the convenience of the reader.
Let In be the set of the ¯rst n positive integers and with the counting probability
measure ¸n on its power set In and V the space of all continuous functions on the product
space A £ M(T £ A) based on its sup-norm topology and endowed with its resulting
Borel ¾-algebra. We shall need the following de¯nition.
De¯nition 12. Let fgngn2I N be a sequence of measurable mappings from a probability
space (Y;Y;¹Y ) to a Polish space X equipped with its Borel ¾-algebra B(X): It is said
to be tight if for any ² > 0; there exists a compact subset K² of X such that for all n 2
IN; ¹Y (g¡1
n (K²)) > 1 ¡ ²:




2(i) for each i 2 In. Assume that the sequence of ¯nite games
is tight. Then for any ² > 0, there exists N 2 IN such that for all n ¸ N, there exists
60This is one of the three criteria for a viable name space that [31] adduce in favor of Loeb spaces.
61Indeed this was one of the points of entry for such a property as is evident in [24], and the subsequent
text of [20].
32fn : In ¡! A and In
² µ In with ¸n(In
² ) > 1 ¡ ², such that for all i 2 In















Proof: Fix any real number ² > 0. We transfer the sequence of ¯nite games to the
nonstandard universe to obtain a sequence fGngn2¤I N of internal games on the associated
sequence of f(In;In;¸n)gn2¤I N of internal probability spaces. The tightness assumption
on the original sequence fGngn2I N implies that for each n 2 ¤IN1, Gn is near standard in
the sense that for ¸-almost all i 2 I and Gn(i) has a standard part ±(Gn(i)) in T £ V.
Fix any n 2 ¤IN1. Let (I;I;¸) be the corresponding Loeb space of (In;In;¸n).63
For i 2 I, let ®(i) = ±(®n(i)), vi = ±(vn
i ), and G(i) = (®(i);vi). Since (I;I;¸) is a
saturated probability space, it follows from Theorem 1 (ii) that there exists a measurable
function f : I ¡! A such that for ¸-almost all i 2 I,
vi(f(i);¸(®;f)
¡1) ¸ vi(a;¸(®;f)
¡1) for all a 2 A.
By Theorem 5.2.4 in [33], we can obtain an internal lifting fn : In ¡! ¤A of f such that





















Comparing the above two equations with the ¯rst equation in this proof, we can assert
that there exists a In
² 2 In with ¸n(In
² ) > 1 ¡ ²; such that for all i 2 In
















Since the above equation holds for all n 2 ¤N1, the conclusion follows the spill-over
principle; for the latter, see Theorem 2.8.11 in [33].
62Here we note that there is a trivial correction to be made to each of the statements of Theorems 6
and 7 in [31]. One needs to use \for all t 2 Tn
² with ¸n(Tn
² ) > 1 ¡ ²" instead of \for all t 2 T", where
¸n is the counting probability on Tn. Similarly, one needs to replace \for all t 2 T" in the statements
of Theorems 9 and 10 by \for almost all t 2 T".
63We abbreviate an entire procedure here, and the interested reader can see [33] and the speci¯c
details to a game-theoretic context in [31].
338 Conclusion
In this paper, the standard theory of large non-anonymous games, as surveyed in [32],
and the subject of several recent extensions and applications,64 is given an alternative
cast that allows a treatment of large games in which individual players have names as
well as traits, and a player's dependence on society is formulated as a joint probability
measure on the space of actions and traits. The key property of saturation, originally due
to [24], and discussed in the context of the conventional formulation of the space of names
in the theory of large games, is identi¯ed, and shown to be su±cient and necessary for a
reformulated and comprehensive theory. It addresses the, by now well-known, di±culty
that there is, in general, no Nash equilibrium if one works with a large game with the
Lebesgue unit interval as the space of players' names and the interval [-1, 1] as the action
space. To be sure, [31] established that this di±culty can be resolved if one works with
an appropriate player space that captures the asymptotic properties of a sequence of
large ¯nite games, the Loeb counting space, it took the suggestion of [28, Theorem 4.6]
that if one works with an uncountable action space, it is a necessary and su±cient for
a robust theory that the player space be saturated. This suggestion is now developed
and now placed in a broader rubric of the seven theorems presented in this paper. It is
hoped that the analytically rigorous and rich formalization of traits that they shape will
be more relevant in terms of applications.
We end this paper with two open questions, one possibly straightforward given the
arguments and results reported above, but the other certainly not so. The ¯rst con-
cerns the exploration of our reformulation from an non-anonymous to an anonymous
formulation, as formulated by [34]. To be more speci¯c, what we have in mind is an
identi¯cation of the role of the saturation property to the theory of large anonymous
games with uncountable compact metric action sets. As is well-understood, this is a
setting in which the space of players' names plays no part, and a large game and its
Nash equilibria are probability measures on the space of characteristics represented by
the space of payo®s, and this space is \built up" solely out of the action space A: It is this
simplicity of conception that makes possible the equivalence theorems presented in [28].
However, as we have seen in Section 2, in the reformulation studied in this paper, the
space of characteristics represented by the space of payo®s involves the triple (T;A;½);
and it is natural to ask whether the theory delineated here extends to probability mea-
sures on this space, and in particular, the equivalence theorems of [28] extend to this
richer setting.
The second question asks whether the reformulation reported here can be pursued
64For the extensions of the theory, see, for example, [16], [22] and [50]; for applications, in addition
to [1, 2], [15] and [19], see [5] and their references.
34in a stochastic setting in that the function ® from the the space of players' names to
the space of traits is conceived of as Young measure, which is to say, a function to the
probabilities on the space of traits rather a (deterministic and identi¯able) point in the
space. From a substantive game-theoretic point of view, this asks whether the theory
can be generalized to situations where only a player's names is known with certainty,
but her individual trait is random, and thereby moving from a large game of complete
information to one with incomplete information. Even a cursory perusal of both applied
and theoretical work identi¯es this as an important question; see [5] and their references
for the rich variety of applications, and the discussion of Bayesian rationality in a ¯nite-
player setting in [12].65 We hope to return to both questions in subsequent work.
9 Appendix
We begin this Appendix by collecting recent results on the distributions of correspon-
dences; we present a composite result culled from the theorems in [30] and [28].
Proposition A. Let X be a compact metric space and (­;A;P) an atomless probability
space. Then the following results are valid if, in addition, (i) X is a countable, or (ii)
(­;A;P) is a saturated probability space.
P1: For any correspondence F from (­;A;P) to X, DF = fPf¡1 : f is a measur-
able selection of Fg is convex.
P2: For any closed-valued correspondence F from (­;A;P) to X, DF is closed.
P3: For any compact-valued correspondence F from (­;A;P) to X, DF is compact.
P4: Let F be a compact-valued correspondence from (­;A;P) to X. Suppose that
Y is a metric space and G is a closed-valued correspondence from ­£Y to X such that:
(a) For all (!;y) 2 ­ £ Y , G(!;y) µ F(!).
(b) For each ¯xed y 2 Y , G(¢;y) (denoted by Gy) is a measurable correspondence
from (­;A;P) to X.
(c) For each ¯xed ! 2 ­, G(!;¢) is upper hemicontinuous from Y to X.
Then the correspondence H(y) = DGy is upper hemicontinuous from Y to M(X).
Proof of Claim 1: (1) We ¯rst show that for any given i; vi(¢;¢) is a continuous
function. Since A has only two points, it is enough to verify the continuity with respect
to ¿. Suppose f¿ng converges weakly to ¿ in M½(T £ A), where ¿n 2 M½(T £ A) for
each n. Let Dc be the set of discontinuity of the function 1[0;i)£fag(t;x). It is clear that
65For a preliminary exploration based on a process rather than a conditional probability, see [47].
35¿(Dc) = 0. By Theorem 25.8 in [13], limn!1 vi(a;¿n) = vi(a;¿) for any given i and a;
and the proof of the claim is complete.66
Next, notice that when i = 0; vi(¢;¢) is identically zero. We show that vi(¢;¢) is a
continuous function of i. vi(a;¿) = ¡
R
T£A 1[0;i)£fag(t;x) d¿. Assume that j > i. Then











= ¿ ([i;j) £ fag)
· j ¡ i:
Therefore, for any i and j in I, jvi(¢;¢) ¡ vj(¢;¢)j · jj ¡ ij, which shows that vi(¢;¢) is a
continuous function of i. Hence, G is a measurable function from I to T £ V(A;T;½).
(2) Assume that f¤ is a Nash equilibrium of the game G. We ¯rst show that









. For this ¯xed i, let
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. Note that given any a 2 A and















Thus, we have, ¸([0;s¤)\f¤¡1( ¹ H)) = ¸([0;s¤)\f¤¡1(¹ T)). Furthermore, s¤ < i. For any
y 2 (s¤;i), vy( ¹ H;¸(®;f¤)¡1) < vy(¹ T;¸(®;f¤)¡1) by the continuity of vy(¢;¢) in y. Since








































































































[0;i) \ f¤¡1(¹ T)
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i 2 I : f¤(i) = ¹ H
ª
: Let g(i) = i on F, g(i) = ¡i on I n F. Then for any
c 2 (0;1], ¸g¡1 ([0;c]) = ¸g¡1 ([¡c;0]) = c=2. So, ¸g¡1 is the uniform distribution on
[¡1;1]: We will show that this itself is a contradiction. Clearly, ¸(F) > 0. Since F is a
subset of [0, 1], ¸g¡1(F) = (1/2)¸(F). On the other hand, g is the identity on F, and
so, ¸g¡1(F) = ¸(F). Thus, 0 6= (1/2)¸(F) = ¸(F). This contradiction establishes that
the game does not have a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. If an atomless probability space (I;I;¸) is not saturated, then there exists
a large non-anonymous game with traits G : (I;I;¸) ¡! T £ V(A;T;½) that does not have
a Nash equilibrium, where A = f¡1;1g, T = [0;b] for some b > 1 and ½ = ¸G
¡1
1 , a
uniform distribution on [0;b].
Proof: First, let (^ I; ^ I; ^ ¸) be the Lebesgue unit interval, ^ T be [0;1] and ^ ® be a func-
tion from ^ I to ^ T satisfying ^ ®(j) = j for each j 2 ^ I. For all j 2 ^ I, let ^ vj(a; ^ ¿) =
¡
R
^ T£A 1[0;j)£fag(t;x)d^ ¿ for all a 2 A and for all ^ ¿ 2 M
^ ¸^ ®¡1 (T £ A). Let ^ G be a function
satisfying ^ G(j) = (^ ®(j); ^ vj) for all j 2 ^ I. As we only replace the action set f ¹ H; ¹ Tg in
Example 1 of Section 3 with f¡1;1g, it is easy to see that ^ G is a large non-anonymous
game without any Nash equilibrium. That is to say, there is no measurable function
^ g : ^ I ¡! A, such that for ^ ¸-almost all j 2 ^ I, ^ vj(^ g(j); ^ ¸(^ ®; ^ g)¡1) ¸ ^ vj(a; ^ ¸(^ ®; ^ g)¡1) for all
a 2 A.
Now, suppose that (I;I;¸) is not saturated. By Proposition 1, we know that
there is a set C 2 I with ¸(C) = ¯, 0 < ¯ < 1 such that (C;IC;¸C) is countably
generated, where IC = fE 2 I;E µ Cg and ¸C(E) = ¸(E)=¯ for all E 2 IC. By
37Maharam's theorem (see [21, 20], we know that any two countably generated atomless
measure algebras are isomorphic. Thus, since the Lebesgue unit interval is countable
generated, there exists an isomorphism from the measure algebra of (C;IC;¸C) to the
measure algebra of the Lebesgue unit interval. By [21, Theorem 4.12], there exists a
measurable mapping h : C ¡! [0;1] such that h induces such an isomorphism. Let
b = 2¡¯ and T = [0;b]. Note that ¸(I nC) = 1¡¯. There exists a measurable function
®0 : I n C ¡! (1;b], such that for any Borel set B in (1;b], ¸(®0)¡1(B) = ^ ¸(B); here we
continue to use ^ ¸ to denote the Lebesgue measure on (1;b]. Construct a function ® from





h(i) for i 2 C
®0(i) for i 2 I n C.
It is clear that ® is measurable. Let ½ = ¸®¡1. By construction, ½ is a uniform distribu-







T£A 1[0;h(i))£fag(t;x)d¿ for i 2 C
a for i 2 I n C:
By the proof of Claim 1, it is now easy to see that vi 2 V(A;T;½) for any i 2 I. Let
G(i) = (®(i);vi) for all i 2 I. By construction, G is a measurable function from I to
T £ V(A;T;½), and thus, a large non-anonymous game with traits.
We now show that G does not have a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that G has a
Nash equilibrium f¤ : I ¡! A. It is obvious that f¤(i) = 1, for i = 2 C. For i 2 C, we
¯rst show that there exists a Borel measurable function g such that f¤(i) = g(h(i)) for
¸-almost all i 2 C. Let C1 = fi 2 C : f¤(i) = 1g. Since h induces an isomorphism from
the measure algebra of (C;IC;¸C) to the measure algebra of the Lebesgue unit interval,
there exists a Borel set B1 µ [0;1], such that, ¸C (C1¢h¡1(B1)) = 0, where ¢ is the
symmetry di®erence on IC, and hence, ¸(C1¢h¡1(B1)) = 0. Thus, g can be constructed
as g(i) = 1 for i 2 B1 and g(i) = ¡1 for i 2 [0;1] n B1. Now we show that there will be












for all a 2 A;











¡1 for all a 2 A:











¡1 for all a 2 A:
Dividing both sides of the above equation by ¯ and thus, normalizing, we have for ¸-











for all a 2 A:
Hence, for ¸-almost all j 2 ^ I, the measurable function g satis¯es
^ vj
³





a; ^ ¸(^ ®;g)
¡1
´
for all a 2 A:
This is a contradiction to the ¯rst paragraph in the proof. Hence, the constructed game
G does not have a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. If an atomless probability space (I;I;¸) is not saturated and T 0 is uncountable
complete separable metric space with a atomless probability measure ½0, there exists a large
non-anonymous game with traits G0 : I ¡! T 0 £ V(A;T0;½0) that has no Nash equilibrium
where A = f¡1;1g.
Proof: Throughout this proof, we reserve the notation (T;½) for the space of traits,
(I;I;¸) for the space of players, A for the action set, G = (®;v) for the game, respectively,
as in the proof of Lemma 1.
Consider any given uncountable complete separable metric space T 0 endowed with
an atomless probability measure ½0 on the Borel ¾-algebra B(T 0) induced by the topology
on T 0. By Theorem 1 in [43], there exists a Borel measurable bijection F : T 0 ¡! T
such that F is measure preserving between (T 0;B(T 0);½0) and (T;B(T);½), and con-
tinuous ½0-almost everywhere, and F ¡1 is continuous ½-almost everywhere. Now con-
sider a mapping G0 = (®0;v0) which satis¯es that ®0 = F ¡1(®) and for each i 2 I,
v0
i(a;¿0) = vi(a;¿0(F;idA)¡1) for all a 2 A and ¿0 2 M½0(T 0 £ A), where idA stands for
the identity map on A. In order to show G0 is a well-de¯ned large non-anonymous game
with traits, we need to show that for any given a 2 A, v0
i(a;¢) is continuous for any i.
Suppose that a sequence f¿0ng in M½0(T 0 £ A) converges weakly to ¿00 2 M½0(T 0 £ A).
Since F is continuous ½0-almost everywhere, (F;idA) is continuous ¿00-almost every-
where. Hence, f¿0n(F;idA)¡1g converges weakly to ¿00(F;idA)¡1 as well. Therefore, for
any a 2 A, the continuity of vi(a;¢) implies v0
i(a;¢) is continuous for any i. Thus, G0 is a
large non-anonymous game with traits.
We now show that the game G0 does not have an equilibrium. Suppose it does have


















for all a 2 A;


















for all a 2 A:












for all a 2 A;
which shows that f0 is a Nash equilibrium of G, the game which is constructed in Lemma
1. This is a contradiction. Therefore, the constructed game G0 does not have any
equilibrium.
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